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Abstract The protection of industrial facilities, classified1
as hazardous, against accidental or intentional explosions2
represents a major challenge for the prevention of personal3
injury and property damage, which also involves social and4
economic issues. We consider here the use of physical barri-5
ers against the effects of these explosions, which include the6
pressure wave, the projection of fragments and the thermal7
flash. This approach can be recommended for the control8
of major industrial risks, but no specific instructions are9
available for its implementation. The influence of a protec-10
tive barrier against a detonation-type explosion is studied11
in small-scale experiments. The effects of overpressure are12
examined over the entire path of the shock wave across the13
barrier and in the downstream zone to be protected. Two14
series of barrier structures are studied. The first series (A)15
of experiments investigates two types of barrier geometry16
with dimensions based on NATO recommendations. These17
recommendations stipulate that the barrier should be 2 m18
higher than the charge height, the thickness at the crest19
should be more than 0.5 m, while its length should be equal20
to twice the protected structure length and the bank slope21
should be equivalent to the angle of repose of the soil. The22
second series (B) of experiments investigates the influence23
of geometrical parameters of the barrier (thickness at the24
crest and inclination angles of the front and rear faces) on25
its protective effects. This project leads to an advance in26
our understanding of the physical phenomena involved in27
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the propagation of blast waves resulting from an external 28
explosion, in the area around a protective physical barrier. 29
The study focuses on the dimensioning of protective barri- 30
ers against overpressure effects arising from detonation and 31
shows the advantage of using a barrier with a vertical front 32
or rear face. 33
Keywords Protective barrier · Explosion effect · Shock 34
wave · Blast load · Detonation 35
1 Introduction 36
At industrial sites, whether public or private, one of the major 37
concerns in modern society is the safety of goods and people 38
with respect to the risks associated with explosions of either 39
accidental or malicious origin. The disasters at AZF in 2001 40
(Toulouse, France), at the Nitrochimie dynamite factory in 41
2003 (Billy-Berclau, France), at a fireworks storage facil- 42
ity at Kolding in 2004 (Denmark) and at the West Fertilizer 43
Company plant in 2013 (Texas, USA) are examples show- 44
ing that “zero risk does not exist”. To limit the occurrence of 45
new accidents, companies have a panoply of safety measures 46
involving prevention or protection against the risks inherent 47
in any accident. 48
The detonation of an explosive charge causes mechanical 49
effects, such as overpressure, heating and possible effects 50
related to the projection of fragments. The presence of a 51
protection barrier (walls, fill and slope) ensures the easy pro- 52
tection of installations and people against the heating effects 53
of an explosion and the projection of fragments. However, 54
protection from the effects of overpressure is not guaranteed 55
simply by the presence of a physical protection barrier of 56
unspecified form. Indeed, the interaction of a shock wave 57
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with a structure is difficult to predict and depends on many58
parameters.59
To our knowledge, few studies have been carried out on60
the optimization of protective barriers. With this objective61
in mind, Zhou and Hao [1] used digital simulations to study62
the effectiveness of a protective wall placed in front of a63
building. Their study demonstrated that the reduction of blast64
load does not depend solely on the height of the protective65
wall, the distance between the centre of the explosion and the66
barrier, the distance between the barrier and the building or67
the height of the building. The effect of wall thickness was68
studied but did not contribute significantly to the blast load69
behind the wall.70
The medium-scale experimental study carried out by71
Allain [2] comprised barriers with two inclined slopes of72
45◦ without a flat crest and using a height of 1.5 m. The tests73
were conducted using spherical charges of TNT (8 and 37 kg)74
and composition B (50 kg). The distance between the charge75
and the obstacle (d) varied from 0.75 to 17 m/kg1/3. These76
medium–scale tests demonstrated that a barrier, according77
to its geometry and form factors, can lead to various flow78
modes. The protective barrier considered in this case accen-79
tuated the positive overpressure of the shock wave and thus80
did not show a protective effect. These results have been81
confirmed by the simulations of Borgers [3], who noted that82
the relaxation on the rear face of a Mach stem results from83
reflection on the front face or from an incident wave (for a84
regular reflection) for certain configurations. This can lead85
to an accentuation of the reflection of the shock wave on the86
ground downstream of the obstacle (according to the nature87
of the wave and the angle of inclination of the wall).88
Thus, the recommendations of NATO evoked in the89
“Guide to good practices in pyrotechnics” [4] estimate a90
minimal thickness of 0.5 m (e > 0.5 m) and specify that91
the height of the barrier must be more than 2 m higher than92
the highest point of the charge.93
Therefore, the objective of the present study was to eval-94
uate the protective effects related to the overpressure of95
barriers according to their form and size. The barriers repre-96
sent protective obstacles placed in the path of the shock wave97
that are intended to mitigate its effects (such as overpressure98
and impulses). The obstacle is assumed to be infinitely rigid,99
so the reflection is considered as “perfect” over all its surface.100
In this study, we consider a generic barrier typology101
(Fig. 1) with the following preset parameters: mass charge102
(W), height and width at crest of the obstacle (H, e), slope103
angles of the barrier faces with respect to the ground (α),104
distance between charge and barrier (d). In this study, the105
explosive charge is placed only at ground level.106
Small-scale experiments are carried out using three types107
of barrier model. Small-scale tests have many advantages.108
Indeed, their cost is low and accurate laboratory methods can109
be applied. Moreover, the test conditions are well controlled110
Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of a protection barrier—W charge mass (kg
of TNT), d distance between centre of charge and the front face (m), e
thickness at crest of obstacle (m), H height of barrier (m), α1 angle of
inclination of front face (◦), α2 angle of inclination of rear face (◦)
and independent of the weather, the reproducibility of test 111
conditions can be readily ensured, and it is easy to establish 112
parametric studies and vary the geometric dimensions of the 113
studied structures. 114
2 Experimental set up 115
2.1 Experimental details 116
The experiments are conducted at a small scale on a test 117
bench [5–7]. 118
The explosive charges are made up of a stoichiometric 119
mixture of propane and oxygen gases. The hemispherical 120
charges used are positioned on the ground, initially confined 121
in a soap bubble. Two charge radii are used: R1 = 0.06 m 122
and R2 = 0.03 m. The explosive charge is initiated by an 123
exploding wire [6]. In the analysis of results (next section), 124
the charge radius will be noted by R0 with its specified value. 125
The zone of experimentation (Fig. 2) is divided into two 126
sectors relative to the centre of the explosive charge [5]: the 127
free field zone and the zone of investigation. In the free field 128
zone, the incident shock wave resulting from detonation of 129
the explosive charge propagates without interaction with the 130
structure. The pressure sensors placed in this zone, called 131
“reference sensors”, are used to check the reproducibility 132
of the detonations. The structure is placed in the zone of 133
investigation along with the explosive charge. Within this 134
zone of investigation, an additional zone can be identified in 135
which the protection barrier prevents arrival of the wave. 136
The dimensions and positioning of the protection barrier 137
depend on the studied configuration (series 1 and 2). Pres- 138
sure sensors (piezoelectric, PCB) are placed flush with the 139
structure to detect possible couplings of the various physi- 140
cal phenomena (reflection, relaxation and recombination of 141
shock waves) as well as downstream from the barrier to study 142
the protective effect. Each position is identified by a distance 143
in direct line with the charge, which is defined by the dis- 144
tance between the position of the sensor and the centre of the 145
explosive charge. 146
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Fig. 2 Schematic diagram of
the experimental setup
2.2 Tested configurations147
The geometrical configurations and dimensions of the bar-148
riers studied in small-scale experiments are designed to149
analyse several physical phenomena (reflection, relaxation150
and recombination of shock waves) as well as the protective151
effect of barriers according to their geometry. The test cam-152
paigns included two series of barriers and a configuration-153
free field (without obstacles), allowing characterization of the154
evolution of various mechanical wave parameters for a gas155
load as a function of the distance travelled by the wave. The156
first series of barriers (A: 1A, 2A) is designed to study two157
barrier geometries based on the recommendations of NATO158
[4]. The second series (B: 1B, 2B) is designed to study the159
influence of two geometrical parameters of the barrier (thick-160
ness at crest and slope angles of the front and rear faces) on161
the protective effect of the barrier. In this study, the impact of162
bypassing waves is not analysed, which means that, for these163
two experimental series, we assume a protective barrier of164
infinite length.165
2.2.1 Configurations with barriers—series A166
The first series of protective barrier geometries is designed167
based on the recommendations of NATO for two gas loads168
(R1 and R2) and using the Hopkinson scale [8] for a scaling169
factor k (k = 15). The protective barriers, 1A and 2A, are170
dimensioned according to the recommendations for the two171
tested gas loads.172
The charge radius (R1) is 0.06 m, and its detonation173
releases an energy of 13.75 × 10−3 MJ (Ek on scale 1/k).174
Thus, for example, for a dimensional scaling factor k of 15,175
the released energy on the real scale is 46.41 MJ (E1 on a176
scale of 1/1).177
The distance between the centre of the charge and the178
obstacle varies between 0.07 and 0.10 m (or between 1.05179
and 1.50 m on the real scale). The dimensions of the first pro-180
tective barrier (1A) follows the recommendations of NATO181
for a gas load of radius R1. The height of the barrier can be 182
calculated from the following equation (1): 183
H1/k = 2k + Radius or H1/k ≈ 0.19 m and H1/1 = 2.85 m, 184
charge radius (R1). (1) 185
The thickness at the crest of the protection barrier can be 186
estimated from the following equation (2): 187
emin,1/k = 0.5k or emin,1/k ≈ 0.03 m. (2) 188
The minimal width of the protective barrier at the top of 189
the explosive charge can be evaluated from the following 190
equation (3): 191
echarge,1/k = 0.9k or echarge,1/k ≈ 0.06 m. (3) 192
The first protective barrier (1A) is dimensioned based on the 193
recommendations for a gas blast load of radius R1 (Fig. 3). 194
The length of barrier 1A is fixed at 0.80 m (12 m on real 195
scale). 196
The second protective barrier (2A) is dimensioned based 197
on the height recommended by NATO for a gas load of radius 198
R2 = 0.03 m. To allow a proper comparison of the two 199
geometries, the wave path length (i.e., distance travelled by 200
the shock wave) over barrier 2B must be almost identical 201
or close to that for barrier 1A (Fig. 4). The height is thus 202
estimated at 0.16 m, and the thickness is fixed at 0.06 m (dis- 203
tances travelled over the trapezoidal profile are 0.527 m for 204
barrier 1A and 0.513 m for barrier 2A, with a difference of 205
3 %). This second geometry allows us to analyse the influ- 206
ence of barrier height and thickness on the protective effect 207
for two explosive loads (R1 and R2). Barriers 1A and 2A 208
have the same length: L = 0.80 m. 209
The distances travelled by the wave passing over the top 210
crest of the barriers 1A (Fig. 3) and 2A (Fig. 4) are very close, 211
0.527 and 0.513 m, respectively. 212
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Fig. 3 Dimensions of barrier 1A with gauge positions—view in the plane z = 0
Fig. 4 Dimensions of barrier
2A with positions of
sensors—view in the plane
z = 0
Fig. 5 Dimensions of barrier
1B with positions of
sensors—view in the plane
z = 0
2.2.2 Configurations with barriers—series B213
The objective of series B is to study the influence of the wall214
inclination angle (upstream and downstream of the barrier)215
on the physical phenomena occurring during interaction of216
the shock wave with a protective barrier and to analyse its217
impact on the protective effect. The slopes of the front and218
rear faces are set at two angles: 45◦ and 90◦. The thickness219
across the crest of the protective barrier is equal to its height220
to allow decoupling of the physical phenomena (e = H =221
0.19, 2.85 m on real scale, for k = 15) and thus create an222
attenuating wave with greater amplitude than for a barrier223
dimension based on the minimal thickness recommended by224
NATO (emin = 0.5 m).225
Barrier 1B has a front face at 45◦ and a rear face at 90◦226
(Fig. 5). The distance of the path of the shock wave over the227
barriers 1B and 2B is fixed at 0.80 m.228
Barrier 2B is built with an inclination angle of 90◦ for the 229
front face and 45◦ for the rear face (Fig. 6). 230
Barriers 1B and 2B have identical sizes, with equal dis- 231
tances covered by the wave passing across the top face 232
(0.649 m). The distances of sensors are summarized in Fig. 7. 233
3 Analysis of phenomena on barrier A 234
We first examine the variation of overpressure as a function 235
of the scaled distance of the path of the shock wave over the 236
barrier (Fig. 8). The reduced distance Z is defined by 237
Z = R3√m , Z = [m kg
−1/3], (4) 238
where R [m] represents the standoff distance from the centre 239
of the explosive charge to the point of interest and m is the 240
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Fig. 6 Dimensions of barrier 2B with positions of sensors—view in the plane z = 0
Fig. 7 View in plane y = 0 showing barriers A and B with positions
of sensors behind the barrier
mass of gas load in kg based on a spherical charge of radius241
R0.242
3.1 Reflection on the front face of barriers 1A and 2A243
The distance between the centre of the explosive charge and244
the point of interest allows us to obtain the incident Mach245
number by using the maximum incident overpressure (P+)246
calculated from empirical formulas.247
The evolution of the overpressure of a blast wave (P+)248
can be estimated for a TNT charge based on the formula249
of Kinney [8] in equation (5) (P+ in Pa with P0 =250
101,325 Pa, W mass in kg of TNT, Z in m kg−1/3)251
P+
P0
=
808 ×
[
1 + ( Z4.5
)2]
√
1 + ( Z0.048
)2 ×
√
1 + ( Z0.32
)2 ×
√
1 + ( Z1.35
)2252
(5)253
For a given gas load (stoichiometric propane-oxygen com-254
bustion), the evolution of the overpressure of a blast wave255
(P+) can be estimated from equations (5) and (6) for an256
energy-scaled distance to the point of combustion of a spher- 257
ical gas load (λ in m/MJ1/3) [5]: 258
ln
(
P+
P0
)
= 0.0895 − 1.7633 × ln(λ) + 0.1528 × ln(λ)2 259
−0.0066 × ln (λ)3 − 0.0021 × ln (λ)4 , (6) 260
or according to the distance scaled with respect to the cubic 261
root of the mass of the explosive gas load (Z in m kg−1/3) 262
[6]: 263
ln
(
P+
P0
)
= 1.486 − 1.782 × ln (Z) − 0.104 × (ln (Z)) 264
+ 0.115 × (ln (Z))3 − 0.017 × (ln (Z))4 . 265
(7) 266
Hence, Fig. 8 shows clearly that all overpressure values on 267
the front face are higher than the overpressures correspond- 268
ing to the free field. The divergent spherical incident wave is 269
reflected on the front face of the protective barrier. The inci- 270
dent Mach number (M1) of the shock wave can be obtained 271
from the maximum of incident overpressure (P+) and the 272
initial pressure (P0 = 101,325 Pa) and γ = 1.4 by using 273
equation (7): 274
M1 =
√
1
2 × γ ×
(
(γ + 1) × P0 + P
+
P0
+ (γ − 1)
)
. 275
(8) 276
The reflection mode (regular reflection or Mach reflection) 277
can vary according to the position and dimensions of the bar- 278
rier (d, H, α1). The point of transition between these reflection 279
modes can be determined by the simplified relation (8) due 280
to Kinney [8], expressed as a function of the Mach number 281
of the incident wave (M1): 282
β1lim =
1.75
M1 − 1 + 39. (9) 283
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Fig. 8 Overpressure as a
function of scaled distance on
barrier A
Fig. 9 Schematic diagram of incident shock wave at impact point I
This angle of transition is compared to the angle of incidence284
calculated from the geometrical relations derived from Fig. 9.285
Equations (10) and (11) allow us to determine the angle286
of incidence (β) and the angle of observation (ζ ).287
ζ = arctan
(
sin α × L
cos α × L + d
)
with L ∈
[
0; H
sin α
]
(10)288
β = π
2
− α + ξ (11)289
An analysis of the overpressures obtained on barriers 1A290
and 2A leads us to estimate the formation of a Mach stem291
on the face before the barrier. This observation of reflection292
modes is also confirmed using the curves presented in TM5-293
1300 for the overpressures considered here [9].294
3.2 Relaxation on the front face of barriers 1A and 2A295
The reflection mode (regular reflection or Mach reflection)296
at the impact point on the front face of the protective barrier297
defines the nature of the wave that is propagated downstream298
from the barrier (incident wave or Mach stem). During the 299
passage of this wave between the impact point and the top 300
of the protective barrier, the wave undergoes a relaxation 301
phenomenon. 302
This physical phenomenon leads to an attenuation of 303
the maximum overpressure in the field close to the edge 304
between the front face and the top of the protective bar- 305
rier for Z = 3−3.3 m kg−1/3 for R2 loads (0.06 m) and 306
Z = 5.9−6.4 m kg−1/3 for R1 loads (0.03 m) (Fig. 8). The 307
maximum overpressure values are less than the free field 308
values, thus contributing to the appearance of a protective 309
effect downstream from the barrier. During wave propaga- 310
tion on the top part of the barrier, maximum overpressure is 311
attenuated by the distance covered by the wave (network of 312
relaxation waves downstream from the shock front). 313
The variation in maximum overpressure between the three 314
configurations arises from the intensity of the incident wave 315
at the top of the barrier. 316
In this zone of interest, the difference between the two 317
obstacles (barriers 1A and 2A) corresponds to the thickness 318
of the barrier (greater thickness for barrier 2A, e2A = e1A×2, 319
the attenuation effect per distance covered is thus slightly 320
more marked), as shown in Fig. 8. 321
3.3 Relaxation on the downstream face of barriers 1A 322
and 2A 323
During the passage of the shock wave between the top and 324
the rear face downstream of the barrier, the wave is subject 325
to a second relaxation. 326
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Fig. 10 Overpressure as a
function of scaled distance on
barrier B
This phenomenon leads to an attenuation of the maxi-327
mum overpressure across the rear face of barriers 1A and 2A328
(Fig. 8).329
The maximum overpressures in the free field are higher330
than the values on the face downstream of the barrier331
(P+free field  P+barrier).332
4 Analysis of phenomena on barrier B333
We now examine the variation of overpressure as a function334
of the scaled distance Z defined by the relation (4) on the335
path of the shock wave over the barrier (Fig. 10).336
4.1 Reflection on barrier 2B337
Barrier 2B has the same downstream face as barrier 1A. The338
physical phenomena on this barrier surface are thus of com-339
parable nature, i.e., reflection of the incident wave on a plane340
inclined at 45◦ and appearance of a Mach stem. These two341
geometries are only different at the top of the protective bar-342
rier, with a much greater thickness at the top of barrier 2B343
(e2B = 0.19 m  e1A = 0.03 m).344
The front face of barrier 2B is inclined at 90◦ and has a345
height of 0.19 m.346
The incident divergent spherical wave resulting from det-347
onation of the gas load is reflected on the front face of barrier348
2B. The surface is inclined at 90◦, and the angle of incidence349
between the wave and wall varies from 0◦ to 70◦ along this350
surface. This variation of the angle of incidence leads to an351
evolution of the reflection mode, with a changeover from reg-352
ular reflection towards Mach reflection. All configurations of 353
barrier 2B lead to the formation of a Mach stem on the front 354
face of the structure near the top. In the case of a regular 355
reflection, a wave is formed on the surface and is propagated 356
in the opposite direction to the incident wave (thus, in the 357
direction of the blast load). This reflected wave results from 358
the reflection of the incident wave on the barrier and interacts 359
with the interface between the air and the detonation products 360
shortly after the end of the detonation. Resulting overpres- 361
sures are higher in the case of barriers with a vertical face 362
with respect to the explosion than in the case of barriers with 363
an inclined face of 45◦. 364
Figure 10 shows the evolution of the maximum reflected 365
overpressure for the various configurations of barriers 1B and 366
2B. 367
4.2 Relaxation on the top of barriers 1B and 2B 368
The Mach stem resulting from reflection of the shock wave 369
on the front face of the barrier undergoes a relaxation at the 370
top of the wall. The angle of deviation of this first relaxation 371
varies according to the inclination angle of the front face of 372
the barrier: 45◦ for barrier 1B and 90◦ for barrier 2B. 373
The phenomenology on the top of barrier 1B is identical 374
to that for barriers 1A and 2A. The level of overpressure 375
decreases rapidly at the foot of the wall because of relaxation 376
induced by the change of slope at the top. The geometry of 377
barrier 1B is different from the barriers of series 1 because 378
of the greater thickness at the top (e = H), thus enhancing 379
the attenuation per distance covered on this surface. 380
The upstream face of barrier 2B has an angle of inclina- 381
tion of 90◦(α1 = 90◦). This leads to an increase in the angle 382
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of deviation of the first relaxation of the Mach stem on the383
top of the barrier. The increase in the angle of deviation thus384
increases the attenuation of the maximum overpressure dur-385
ing relaxation. The maximum overpressure then decreases386
more rapidly than in the case of barrier 1B, which has a front387
face inclined at 45◦.388
4.3 Relaxation on the downstream face of barriers 1B389
and 2B390
The shock wave propagated over the top of the barrier391
undergoes a second relaxation during its passage over the392
downstream face of the barrier: “relaxation in two stages”393
(non-zero thickness at the top, e = 0 m).394
For barrier 2B, the rear face is inclined at 45◦(θ = 45◦);395
thus, the slope angle at the top of the rear face is less than that396
for barrier 1B (θ = 90◦). On the rear face of the barrier, the397
maximum overpressure undergoes less attenuation compared398
to barrier 1B (Fig. 10).399
5 Protective effect of barriers A and B400
5.1 Normative distance401
The attenuation factor allows us to evaluate the protective402
effect of the barrier compared to a configuration-free field403
(without structure), as shown in equation (11):404
AP = P
+
r
P+i
, (12)405
where P+i is the maximum incident overpressure in the406
free field [6] and P+r is the maximum overpressure in the407
presence of the protection barrier. Thus, if AP tends towards408
zero, then the maximum protective effect is characterized by409
a new scaled distance Rbarrier [m MJ−1/3] defined as follows:410
Rbarrier = R[
E
(
1 − d√
d2+S
)]1/3 , (13)411
where R is the distance between the centre of the gas load and412
the measurement point [m], E the energy released by the gas413
load [MJ], d the distance between the centre of the charge414
and the lower point on the front face of the barrier [m] and415
S the cross section [m2]. This new parameter corresponds416
to a normative distance which offers the major advantage of417
considering the form of the barrier rather than the classical418
parameter n defined by the ratio of the ground distance behind419
the barrier to the barrier height [4].420
The energy released by the propane-oxygen reaction is421
obtained by multiplying the energy per unit volume Ev by422
the volume V of the spherical charge: E = Ev × V . By 423
considering the density ρ of the gas mixture, the relationship 424
between Rbarrier and Z (4) can be derived as follows: 425
Rbarrier = Z
(
ρ
Ev
)1/3 1(
1 − d√
d2+S
)1/3 (14) 426
Nevertheless, the normative distance presented here is not 427
appropriate for a wall that is infinitely high and infinitely 428
thin. 429
5.2 Attenuation factor 430
The wave that passes over the top of the protective bar- 431
rier is reflected on the ground downstream from the barrier 432
(Fig. 11). This physical phenomenon leads to an increase in 433
the maximum overpressure downstream from the barrier. 434
Figure 11 shows the evolution of the attenuation factor for 435
the four analysed geometries (barriers 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B) 436
and for the two studied loads (R1 and R2). 437
Figure 11 shows the following: 438
– The expression of Rbarrier allows us to highlight the 439
effects of the type of barrier and the charge volume. 440
Hence, we obtain four groups of curves, for different val- 441
ues of studied load R0 and distance d: two of the groups 442
correspond to barrier A, while the other two correspond 443
to barrier B. 444
– In the case of barrier A, the attenuation may become 445
greater than 1 if the distance d tends toward 0.14 m. Con- 446
sequently, these configurations lead to the opposite effect 447
than that expected. This situation is never present in the 448
case of barrier B. 449
– The Mach stem resulting from the reflection phenom- 450
enon on the front face of the barrier B relaxes at the top 451
of the barrier at an angle of 45◦ for barrier 1B and 90◦ 452
for barrier 2B. The Mach stem relaxes again on the face 453
downstream of the barrier at two different angles: at 90◦ 454
and 45◦ for barriers 1B and 2B, respectively. This dimen- 455
sioning also assigns the angle of incidence to ground level 456
downstream from the structure: barrier 1B, β1B = 0◦ and 457
barrier 2B, β2B = 45◦. 458
– The slope of the walls must be dimensioned according 459
to the size of the protection zone; for example, due to 460
the relaxation phenomenon, α2 contributes to a slight 461
attenuation, as well as a possible reflected overpres- 462
sure on the ground (possible formation of a Mach stem, 463
β > 40◦) and a less marked protective effect over a larger 464
proximal but visible field (and conversely for barrier 465
1B). 466
– Thus, at a given energy E regardless of the distance d, it is 467
clear that barrier B leads to a better protection. The result- 468
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Fig. 11 Evolution of the
attenuation factor downstream
from barriers A and B for the
two studied gas loads and at
various distances d between the
centre of the explosive charge
and the foot of the barrier
Fig. 12 Evolution of the
attenuation factor downstream
from barrier used by Allain [2]
for different masses of TNT and
distances from the charge to the
foot of the barrier
ing protective effect is nearly identical between barriers469
1A and 2A or 1B and 2B. The presence of a 90◦ angle470
on a barrier (downstream or upstream) causes a sensi-471
tive attenuation of the overpressure compared to barriers472
with two angles at 45◦. The result is confirmed for the473
two investigated loads (R1 = 0.03 m and R2 = 0.06 m).474
Barrier B allows an increase in the attenuation of the475
maximum overpressure due to a marked relaxation phe-476
nomenon (increase in the angle of deviation for one of the477
two relaxations, θ = 90◦). These differences can explain478
the variation in the attenuation coefficient between the479
two barrier geometries A and B (Fig. 11). The barrier 480
geometries tested in series A thus offer less protection 481
than those tested in series B. 482
5.3 Comparison at medium scale 483
– The presence of some thickness at the top of the bar- 484
rier (e = 0) allows relaxation “in two stages”, with a 485
Mach stem resulting from reflection on the front face. 486
This recommendation of the NATO report represents
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“good practice” for the dimensioning of protective barri-487
ers (e > 0.5 m).488
– We highlight that barrier A is less effective than barrier489
B. To corroborate this observation obtained with small-490
scale experiments, the experimental results of Allain [2]491
are expressed versus the normative distance on Fig. 12.492
The barriers considered by Allain had two inclined slopes493
of 45◦ without any thickness at the top and a height of494
1.5 m, using two types of TNT charges (8 and 37 kg).495
– The experimental results of Allain [2] reported here496
highlight the amplifying effect of “overpressure” due to497
the barrier. This phenomenon can be explained by the498
hypothesis that maintenance of the Mach number of the499
shock front (weak attenuation of overpressure) is caused500
by diffraction and relaxation on the rear face of the Mach501
stem (resulting from reflection on the front face) or affect-502
ing the incident wave. In turn, this imposes an angle of503
incidence close to 45◦ that can approach the requirements504
for the formation of a new Mach stem at the end of the505
rear face of the barrier for certain configurations. This506
possible relaxation is accompanied by a reflection on the507
ground, possibly leading to the creation of a stronger508
Mach stem on overpressure.509
– Consequently, the geometry of the barrier used by Allain510
[2] appears to be unsuitable for the protection of peo-511
ple, equipment and structures, thus supporting our results512
obtained at small scale with barrier A.513
6 Conclusion and recommendations514
for dimensioning515
The study of various protective barrier configurations leads516
to an analysis of the interaction of shock waves with barriers517
according to their geometrical parameters and an assessment518
of their impact on the protective effect.519
The ideal protective barrier is a parallelepiped with sig-520
nificant height and thickness. Indeed, this geometry allows521
enhancement of the attenuation of the maximum overpres-522
sure by increasing the distance covered (Taylor waves) and523
favouring the presence of “strong” relaxations (angles of524
deviation (θ ) close to 90◦). Nevertheless, according to the525
additional constraints of dimensioning (such as limited space526
and financing), this type of geometry may be difficult to527
implement and can be “oversized” compared to the needs528
of the user (P+ downstream  0.020 bar, threshold529
of the last affected zone (Z5)). The optimal dimension-530
ing of a protective barrier thus depends on the available531
resources and dimensions of the configuration of interest532
(position of the zone to be protected with respect to the blast533
load).534
Thus, the user should optimize the dimensioning of the 535
barrier based on three sets of geometrical parameters: height 536
(H) - thickness (e), inclination angles of the front and rear 537
faces (α1 and α2), as well as the positioning of the barrier 538
with respect to the load (d). 539
The recommendations of NATO [4] appear robust and use- 540
ful for promoting “good practices” in the dimensioning of 541
protective barriers. These recommendations allow consider- 542
ation of a minimal height and thickness to ensure a protective 543
effect downstream from the barrier. Nevertheless, the choice 544
of maximum possible height and thickness according to the 545
available resources can be used to enhance the phenomenon 546
of attenuation by increasing the distance covered by the shock 547
wave over the structure. In addition, the tests conducted by 548
Allain [2] clearly show the limited effect of this type of bar- 549
rier geometry, as indicated by the small-scale experiments 550
(barrier A). 551
The choice of the inclination angles of the front and rear 552
faces also depends on the means available. Indeed, an incli- 553
nation angle of 90◦ should be used to enhance attenuation of 554
the maximum overpressure caused by the presence of strong 555
relaxations on the edges of the barrier. Moreover, the use of 556
a vertical barrier face prevents the rapid formation of a Mach 557
stem upstream (front face) and downstream from the barrier. 558
Formation of a Mach stem leads to a recompression of the 559
shock wave, thus reducing the protective effect of the bar- 560
rier. The experimental results obtained in this study clearly 561
demonstrate that barrier B with an inclination angle of 90◦ 562
is more efficient in terms of overpressure attenuation than 563
barrier A. 564
However, this type of dimensioning (α1 = α2 = 90◦) 565
also implies major constraints affecting the resistance of the 566
structure, with the risk of projection of new fragments from 567
the barrier (maximum considered overpressure on the front 568
and rear faces of the barrier). 569
The positioning of the protective barrier relative to the 570
explosive charge depends on the geometry of the selected 571
barrier and the position or size of the downstream zone to 572
be protected. Indeed, according to the slope of the wall, the 573
flow mode can be modified by the formation of a Mach stem 574
upstream and downstream from the protective barrier. 575
– If the angle of inclination is high (α1 near to 90◦), a 576
protective barrier placed in the field close to the blast 577
load offers a strong protective effect downstream from 578
the barrier (important screen effect [3]. Nevertheless, 579
this dimensioning also implies high overpressure on 580
the upstream barrier face, in particular by deformation 581
of the reflection due to the presence of an interface 582
between air and detonation products in a field close to 583
the wall and shock wave (for a gas load (stoichiometric 584
propane-oxygen combustion), d < 0.58 m/MJ1/3; for a 585
condensed chemical charge (TNT), d < 0.88 m/kg1/3). 586
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– If an angle of inclination of 90◦ for the front face can-587
not be considered on an industrial site, this can be offset588
by using an angle of 90◦ on the rear face since similar589
attenuations are obtained (comparison of barriers 1B and590
2B).591
– If the angle of inclination of the front face is less than592
90◦ (α1  90◦), the protective effect is also more pro-593
nounced in terms of amplitude for a barrier placed in594
the field close to the load (important screen effect). The595
overpressure reflected on the upstream face is also less596
marked. However, a barrier placed in the far field of the597
blast load offers a less important protective effect in terms598
of amplitude compared with a barrier placed in the near599
field [3].600
These “good practices” can be used to guide engineers in601
the optimal dimensioning of protective barriers according to602
the configuration on the ground and the resources available603
([10]). The construction of nomograms will supplement these604
recommendations and allow a precise evaluation of the pro-605
tective effects according to the geometrical parameters of the606
barriers (d, H, e, α1 and α2).607
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